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TENANT REMEDIES FOR A DENIAL OF
ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND FOR HARASSMENT
-THE NEW YORK APPROACH
I. Introduction
Much has been said and written about the inequities of the landlord-
tenant system, especially as it affects the ghetto and lower-income tenant.'
A significant portion of legal comment has reviewed the historical de-
velopment of the common law and has analyzed the resulting imbalance
between landlord and tenant. The conclusion of much review and analysis
is that, because of the problems inherent in the common law remedies,
development in the law is needed to limit the landlord's ability to take
financial advantage of impoverished tenants.2
In response to this sort of criticism, the New York Legislature has
enacted a series of statutory remedies intended to afford the tenant pro-
tection when the landlord fails to provide adequate services. The Legis-
lature has been faced, however, with the problem of finding a proper
balance between the property rights of the landlord and the human rights
of the tenant. As a result, each of these remedies has severe shortcomings
which render its operation difficult and at times virtually impossible.3
II. Stay of Proceedings Under Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law Section 755
Section 755, New York's rent withholding provision, provides for a
stay of proceedings for eviction on non-payment of rent, or for any action
for rent or rental value, when such proceedings are instituted by the
landlord.4 The statute, as amended, makes the remedy available through-
out the state.3 There are two alternative sections, 1 (a) and 1 (b), under
which the tenant may move for a stay.
Section 1 (a) has two requirements. First, the tenant must prove that
a notice or order to remove a nuisance or violation, or to make necessary
and proper repairs, has been issued by the municipal department charged
1. See generally Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 225
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Quinn & Phillips]; Schoshinski, Remedies of the
Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 Geo. L.J. 519 (1966).
2. Quinn & Phillips 250.
3. For a procedural review, see N. LeBlanc, A Handbook of Landlord-
Tenant Procedures and Law, with Forms (2d ed. 1969).
4. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
5. Id. § 755.
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with the responsibility of enforcing the multiple dwelling law or applic-
able housing code. Secondly, the court must find that the condition against
which the order is directed is equivalent to a constructive eviction of the
tenant from a portion of the premises, or that the condition is, or is likely
to become, dangerous to life, health or safety. If these requirements are
met, a stay will be granted. Under this section, with the violation or vio-
lations being of record, the burden falls upon the landlord to prove that
the condition does not endanger life, health or safety, or that it has been
repaired or removed.0
Under Section 1 (b), which does not require violations of record, the
court may still grant the stay if, in its opinion, proper proof is made that
a condition exists such as to constructively evict the tenant from a portion
of the occupied premises, or if the premises are, or are likely to become,
dangerous to life, health or safety. Although the section does not ex-
pressly so indicate, a fair reading indicates that the burden of proof is
on the tenant to prove the hazardous condition.7
Section 1 (c) states an important exception, in that the court may not
grant a stay where it appears that the condition was caused either by the
wilful or negligent act of the tenant or his agent.8
Prior to the 1969 amendments to section 755, the requisite condition
was limited to one constituting constructive eviction. In this regard,
court standards varied widely as to what conditions were sufficient for a
stay under section 755. One commentator stated:
The violations of record must be sufficiently dangerous to be tantamount to a
constructive eviction. Generally, that means that there are violations which
are serious in nature and constitute a danger to the tenant's health and safety.
In actual fact, it varies considerably from judge to judge as to what constitutes
a sufficient number of violations or a sufficiently serious violation. For some
judges, any violation is sufficient to obtain a 755 Order. With other judges,
the building must be nearly falling down before they will grant the tenant a
755 Order. Certain types of violations are more meaningful to the court than
others. Such violations include no heat, rat infestation, no water, no hot water,
or fire department violations. Violations regarding failure to repair usually
must be quite numerous before they constitute a good basis for a 755 Order. 9
6. Id. § 755(1)(a).
7. Id. § 755(1)(b).
8. Id. § 755(1)(c).
9. N. LeBlanc, supra note 3, at 13.
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There has been, additionally, some question as to the requirements for
finding a constructive eviction under the statute. At common law, con-
structive eviction requires abandonment of the premises.' 0 However, the
legislative intent of section 755 seems clear from the text. The require-
ment of abandonment would make little sense in a statute which is de-
signed as a defense to an action for eviction. Thus, most courts have
rightly held that there is no such requirement," although one recent case
has inexplicably found difficulty in reconciling the concept of a construc-
tive eviction without an abandonment.12
The problem is obviated, however, by the additional language in the
amended statute: "is, or is likely to become, dangerous to life, health, or
safety," which gives the courts adequate leeway in evaluating the serious-
ness of the condition. This language is open to interpretation, however,
and, like the prior constructive eviction standard, will require a substan-
tial hazard to obtain a section 755 stay." There is, therefore, some un-
certainty as to what qualifies for a stay of proceedings. One may conclude
that the many smaller, harassing annoyances will not suffice to justify
granting a stay. Since the statute is defensive only, it provides no affirma-
tive method for correcting hazards other than withholding rent and wait-
ing for the landlord's action to dispossess."
Even more importantly, rentals must be deposited with the court in
lieu of payment to the landlord. 5 When the condition is rectified, the
landlord receives all the rentals due. Alternatively, the court has the
right to disburse deposited funds to contractors for the effectuation of
repairs or the payment of outstanding debts to suppliers of essential
10. Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256
N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970).
11. Malek v. Perdina, 58 Misc. 2d 960, 297 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
For a case decided under the prior law (Civ. Prac. Act § 1446-a), see Emray
Realty Corp. v. DeStefano, 5 Misc. 2d 352, 160 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
12. Buddwest & Saxony Properties, Inc. v. Layton, 62 Misc. 2d 171, 308
N.Y.S.2d 208 (Yonkers City Ct. 1970).
13. For a pre-amendment finding, see De Koven v. 780 West End Realty Co.,
48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Civ. Ct. 1965). For a finding as to condi-
tions dangerous to life, health or safety, under Article 7-A, N.Y. Real Prop.
Actions Law §§ 769-782 (McKinney Supp. 1971), see Himmel v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 47 Misc. 2d 93, 262 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Civ. Ct. 1965). See also Budd-
west & Saxony Properties, Inc. v. Layton, 62 Misc. 2d 171, 308 N.Y.S.2d 208
(Yonkers City Ct. 1970).
14. After loss of a § 755 defense, an eviction warrant may still be stayed.
N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 751 (McKinney 1963).
15. Id. § 755(2).
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services.' 6 In either case, the landlord risks only a delay in obtaining rent
monies by failing to repair and waiting for a court decree. If such a
decree is forthcoming, the landlord pays only what he would have had to
pay in any case; the balance of funds are returned to him. If the court
finds the condition not to be dangerous to life, health or safety, or not to
be the equivalent of a constructive eviction, the decree will never event-
uate.
These weaknesses combine to render the section 755 remedy a some-
what ineffective solution to tenant problems. Some of these weaknesses
were considered in the enactment of Article 7-A of the Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law.
m. "Rent Strikes" by Tenant Groups Under Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law Article 7-A
The Article 7-A proceeding is an affirmative proceeding, instituted by
service of petition issued by the court. It requires one-third of all tenants
in a multiple dwelling17 in the City of New York to act in concert. The
requisite grounds for such action are as follows:
[T]here exists in such multiple dwellings or in any part thereof a lack of heat
or of running water or of light or of electricity or of adequate sewage disposal
facilities, or any other condition dangerous to life, health or safety, which has
existed for five days, or an infestation by rodents, or any combination of such
conditions. 18
It is notable that Article 7-A does not refer to conditions likely to
become dangerous to life, health or safety as does section 755. This
distinction, coupled with the five-day existence clause, makes this pro-
ceeding more of an emergency provision.' 9 However, it appears that such
16. Id. § 755(3), as amended (McKinney Supp. 1971).
17. In Article 7-A a multiple dwelling is defined as "any dwelling which
constitutes a multiple dwelling as defined in the multiple dwelling law, of six or
more apartments." N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 782 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
This differs from the normal definition of multiple dwelling. See N.Y. Mult.
Dwell. Law § 4(7) (McKinney Supp. 1971) (residence of three or more families
living independently).
18. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 770 (McKinney Supp. 1971) (emphasis
added).
19. Kahn v. Riverside Syndicate, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 515, 308 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1st Dept.), motion for leave to appeal denied, 27 N.Y.2d 724, 262 N.E.2d 672,
314 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1970), noting emergency situation required.
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action is applicable even in a situation short of an emergency, but where
services essential to life, health or safety have been denied.20 The term
"life, health or safety," however, is still subject to the same problem of
interpretation as under section 755.
Article 7-A also requires withheld rents to be deposited with the court,
but in the implementation of a judgment rendered in an Article 7-A
proceeding, the court may appoint an administrator (an attorney, certi-
fied public accountant or licensed real estate broker) to take over the
operation of the multiple dwelling, using the deposited rent funds for
operating capital.2 This remedy has also been used in a case where fire
damage had rendered part of a dwelling uninhabitable, and the landlord,
seemingly, was no longer operating the building. The administrator is
given the power not only to repair the building, but also to rent restored
apartments and to re-rent as apartments become available. 22
In addition to the problems discussed above, there is a further difficulty,
not limited to Article 7-A and section 755, but applicable to any actions
against the landlord by the tenant. A periodic tenant, a tenant at suffer-
ance and a tenant on lease risk eviction, either on thirty days notice, or
at the expiration of the lease, by either defending or instituting procedures
to correct housing violations. 23 This so-called retaliatory eviction has been
the subject of much legal comment, and some court recognition, but still
remains a great deterrent to the tenant's availing himself of his legal
rights.24 For the tenant at sufferance, and for the lessee as the expiration
of the lease approaches, the fear of retaliation is a real concern, and
unless the tenant is prepared to find new accommodations, the usefulness
20. Himmel v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 47 Misc. 2d 93, 262 N.Y.S.2d 515
(Civ. Ct. 1965).
21. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 778 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
22. Oyola v. Combo Creditors, Inc., 64 Misc. 2d 727, 315 N.Y.S.2d 666
(Civ. Ct. 1970).
23. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 228 (30 days for tenant at will or by sufferance);
§ 232(a) (30 days for monthly tenancy within city of New York); § 232(b)
(one month notice to terminate monthly tenancy or month-to-month tenancy
outside the city of New York) (McKinney 1968).
24. The leading case in the area of retaliatory evictions is Edwards v. Habib,
397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). See also
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchin-
son, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Dist. Ct. 1962); Hosey v. Club Van
Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097,
294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968).
A few states have passed anti-retaliatory eviction statutes, See, e.g., Ill. Rev.
Stat., ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1965); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5646(4) (Supp.
1972).
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of such remedies as section 755 and Article 7-A diminishes markedly.
Relocation is rarely the practical option of the urban ghetto tenant.
Article 7-A provides some strength in numbers, under the presumption
that the landlord will not evict a substantial number of tenants. However,
the Article 7-A proceeding requires organization, and the organizer may
be subject to an even greater risk of retaliation.2 5
The Article 7-A proceeding gives considerably more power to the
tenant than does section 755. However, organization is difficult; tenants
are frequently unwilling to "stick their necks out," and the facts must
"sustain the existence of the emergency situation which the Legislature
envisaged when Article 7-A was enacted in 1965. '' -6 Of course, the land-
lord retains the defense that the condition was caused by the fault of the
petitioners. 7 In addition, the remedy of rent withholding exposes the
landlord to no greater risk or expenditure, as the withheld monies are
used only to make the necessary repairs and the balance is returned to
the landlord. Also, even under Article 7-A, the landlord can show his
willingness to make repairs, give the court assurances as to time, and
retain management of his estate.
28
IV. Rent Abatement Under Multiple Dwelling Law
Section 302(a)
The legislature, realizing the inherent weakness in rent withholding,
has also specified circumstances under which rent may be abated. Section
302 (a) applies to cities with populations of 400,000 and over.2 9 It covers
conditions which constitute, or which will constitute if not promptly
corrected, a fire hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of
the occupants. However, this statute encourages the landlord to delay,
since the right to abate is subject to three qualifications: (1) notice of
violation must be on file in the municipal department records; (2) notice
must have been given to the last registered owner; and (3) such violation
must exist for six months from time of notice.
30
25. For the unfortunate result of an attempt at such organization, see Lincoln
Sq. Apts. v. Davis, 58 Misc. 2d 292, 295 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Civ. Ct. 1968) aff'd
per curiam, 64 Misc. 2d 859, 316 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
26. Kahn v. Riverside Syndicate, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 515, 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d
65, 66 (1st Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 27 N.Y.2d 724, 262
N.E.2d 672, 314 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1970).
27. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 775 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
28. Id. § 777.
29. The Multiple Dwelling Law itself applies to cities with a population of
500,000 or over. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 3(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
30. Id. § 302(a)(3)(a).
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The statute does not allow the tenant to recover rents voluntarily paid
during the six-month period. The tenant often does not know if the vio-
lation has been recorded, and notice may be difficult to achieve and prove.
It is the six-month delay provision itself, however, that is especially
questionable when one recalls that the situation to be remedied is a fire
hazard or a serious danger to life or health. If the purpose of the statute
is to coerce the landlord to repair or rectify the condition, it seems slight
coercion indeed. On the other hand, if its purpose is to remedy a danger-
ous condition, or to recompense the tenant for his time without service,
then there should not be a six month delay."
V. The Remedy for Welfare Recipients Under Social
Services Law Section 143(b)
Section 143 (b),32 known as the Spiegel Law, is perhaps New York's
most theoretically effective piece of remedial legislation, although the
statute benefits only welfare recipients. As the Department of Welfare is
allowed to pay rent directly to the landlord, and can withhold payment
where it has knowledge of any violation of law which is dangerous, haz-
ardous, or detrimental to life or health, the power to control the land-
lord's actions is apparently greater in this statute than in any other. It
is notable, however, that only the Welfare Department and not the indi-
vidual tenant can invoke the section 143 (b) remedy.
A further remedy available under section 143(b) is the ability to ini-
tiate a proceeding before the appropriate housing rent commission to
lower the maximum rent allowable for lack of essential services to which
the tenant is entitled. The legislative intent of the provision is clear:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that certain evils and abuses exist
which have caused many tenants, who are welfare recipients, to suffer untold
hardships, deprivation of services and deterioration of housing facilities be-
cause certain landlords have been exploiting such tenants by failing to make
necessary repairs and by neglecting to afford necessary services in violation
of the laws of the state. Consequently, in the public interest, the necessity for
the enactment of the provisions of this act is hereby declared as a matter of
legislative determination.83
31. For a discussion of the statute, see Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc.
2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
32. N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 143(b) (McKinney 1966). See also N. LeBlanc,
supra note 3, at 11-12.
33. Ch. 997, § 1, [19621 McKinney Sess. Laws of N.Y. 3207.
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It is significant that serious slum conditions exist in areas where the
proportion of welfare recipients is high. Presumably, due to such factors
as departmental overwork, limited numbers of staff lawyers and a fear
of discouraging landlords from accepting welfare tenants, the remedy is
not invoked more frequently and more effectively.
VI. Rent Control Protections and the New Rent Control Statute
Rent control in New York was an emergency measure caused by the
critical post-war housing shortage.14 The shortage still exists, although
adequate housing may be a better description of the missing quantity. In
recognition of the existence of this condition, the New York Legislature,
effective June 30, 1971, extended the Emergency Rent Control Law for
an additional two yearsY5 This same act, however decontrols apartments
presently under control as they become vacant. The purposes of the stat-
ute, as stated by Governor Rockefeller of New York, are: (1) to attack
the ills caused by rent control; (2) to restore reasonable market incen-
tives for the maintenance and upgrading of housing; (3) to discourage
the appalling abandonment of housing; and (4) to establish an atmos-
phere conducive to massive construction of new housing by the private
sector.36
The controlled tenant has in the past been subject to minor harassment
because the landlord was entitled to a small statutory increase in maxi-
mum rent allowable if a vacancy occurred.8 7 Under the new law, the land-
lord has greater incentive to cause vacancies, as decontrol provides the
landlord with the right to determine the rental amount 8 The legislature,
realizing the temptation it was providing for landlords, included a strict
set of provisions against tenant harassment:
34. In 1942, the United States government instituted the first emergency rent
controls under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26 § 2, 56 Stat. 24,
repealed, Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554 § 8(a), 80 Stat. 651. In
New York, commercial rent control was enacted in 1945, N.Y. Unconsol. Law
§§ 8521-8538 (McKinney 1961), business rent control, also in 1945, N.Y. Un-
consol. Law §§ 8551-8567 (McKinney 1961), and residential control in 1946,
N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8581-8597 (McKinney 1961).
35. N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8581-82 (McKinney Supp. 1971). Under this act,
§ 85 82(2) (i) specifically decontrols apartments as they become vacant.
36. Governor's Memoranda [1971] McKinney Sess. Laws of N.Y. 2608-09.
37. N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8582, 8584 (McKinney Supp. 1970), as amended,
N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8582, 8584 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
38. For status of rent upon vacation of rent-controlled premises, see N.Y.
Unconsol. Law § 8582(i),(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971). Note: if decontrol is
either by commission determination or by municipal decision, see N.Y. Unconsol.
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It shall be unlawful for any landlord or any person acting on his behalf, with
intent to cause the tenant to vacate, to engage in any course of conduct (in-
cluding, but not limited to, interruption or discontinuance of essential ser-
vices) which interferes with or disturbs or is intended to interfere with or
disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of the tenant in his use or oc-
cupancy of the housing accommodations. 89
The Rent Control Commission has the power of enforcement under
this section. The commission may in its discretion apply to the supreme
court for an injunction enforcing compliance with the provision,4 ° or
may certify the facts to the district attorney of any county having juris-
diction, with the applicable sanctions being a fine of not more than
$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.4' Although
the injunctive remedy and the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions may
work to the advantage of the tenant, he may not bring the action himself,
and is dependent upon the commission. However, the legislature has seen
fit to provide the tenant with a separate remedy for landlord harassment
which has caused an abandonment:
Any tenant who has vacated his housing accommodations because the land-
lord or any person acting in his behalf, with intent to cause the tenant to
vacate, engaged in any course of conduct (including, but not limited to, in-
terruption or discontinuance of essential services) which interfered with or
disturbed or was intended to interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose,
peace or quiet of the tenant in his use or occupancy of the housing accommo-
dations may, within ninety days after vacating, apply to the commission for
a determination that the housing accommodations were vacated as a result of
such conduct, and may, within one year after such determination, institute a
civil action against the landlord by reason of such conduct. In such action the
landlord shall be liable to the tenant for three times the damages sustained on
account of such conduct plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs as deter-
mined by the court. In addition to any other damages the cost of removal of
property shall be a lawful measure of damages. 42
Law § 8592(2-a) (McKinney Supp. 1971). Note also local rent stabilization stat-
utes that may affect landlord's freedom to increase rent beyond a certain limit.
39. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8590(5) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
40. Id. § 8591(1) (McKinney 1961).
41. Id. § 8591(2).
42. Id. § 8591(7) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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With respect to this last provision, Governor Rockefeller noted that
"this measure recognizes the fears of tenants and enacts strong deterrents
-including provisions for the award of attorney's fees to insure that
even the poorest person will have access to his legal rights."'
Unfortunately, this purpose may not in fact be effected by the statute.
Under this section, the tenant must vacate his premises before he has a
cause of action. It bears the same disadvantage as the common law con-
structive eviction, where abandonment is required for relief from rent.44
The purpose of statutory remedies for a denial of essential services is to
circumvent the requirement of abandonment. Otherwise, the common
law remedy of constructive eviction would be adequate protection against
denial of essential services. Now the legislature has reverted to an old
standard: first you leave, and then you determine your rights.
Although the new provision suggests a successful deterrent against
landlord harassment of tenants, there are several additional factors that
should be considered. First, similar to housing codes, the enforcement
of the criminal sanctions under the statute may be far less effective than
would be supposed from the text. 5 Secondly, there is complete depen-
dence on the discretion of the Rent Commission to bring an action while
the tenant is in possession, and to render a finding of harassment if the
tenant vacates. Thirdly, the abandonment requirement limits the tenant's
personal remedy, as he must choose between vacating or foregoing his
cause of action. Fourthly, the decontrol provisions of the new law en-
courage the landlord to maintain run-down conditions, for it should be
noted that disrepair and dissatisfaction help cause the voluntary vacating
of controlled and decontrolled units.
These failings may well render the new provision relatively ineffective
in preventing or remedying harassment.
VII. New Common Law Remedies
An examination of the foregoing statutes shows that the legislature
is either unwilling, or unable, to overcome the bias inherent in the land-
43. Governor's Memoranda [1971] McKinney Sess. Laws of N.Y. 2609.
44. Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256
N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970).
45. E.g., Quinn & Phillips 240, n.36 ($50 fine under housing code for
violation costing $42,500 to correct). See also Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code
Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1254 (1966).
46. There is also a possible remedy in asking the rent commission to go to
the court and get an order under N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8591(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
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lord's basic property right to free alienation of his freehold estate .4 The
imbalance results in tenant problems in two major categories. The first
involves conditions where the landlord, for whatever reason, has failed
to provide the measure of essential services required for healthful, safe
living. The second deals with intentional actions of the landlord, whether
to cause a tenant to vacate, to cause him to agree to a rent increase, or
simply as retaliation, where such actions do not amount to a denial of
essential services.
In both areas, the statutory remedies fail to provide adequate relief.
There exist, however, based upon recent case law, effective solutions for
each set of problems.
A. Denial of Essential Services and the Warranty of Habitability
At early common law, the landlord-tenant relationship was considered
purely contractual, with the lessee acquiring no rights in the land.4" As
the law developed, however, the leasehold became an estate in land, and
the lease itself a conveyance.49 The landlord's sole responsibilities were
to deliver the right to possession, and thereafter not to interfere with that
possession.50 The lease acquired a non-contractual nature, so that cove-
nants between landlord and tenant were construed independently. 51
Therefore, the tenant's duty to pay rent was independent of the landlord's
promise to repair, or to provide services. As a result, if the tenant had an
action for damages for breach of covenant, he was still liable for the rent.
Recently, however, several important appellate court decisions in other
jurisdictions have returned to a more contractual approach to the lease,
and have found both an implied warranty of habitability, and a mutuality
of covenants, making the payment of rent and the providing of essential
services mutually dependent.
In Lemle v. Breeden,52 the tenant brought an action for damages re-
sulting from rat infestation of a furnished dwelling. The Supreme Court
of Hawaii found an implied warranty of habitability. Through compari-
sons with the warranty of merchantability from sales law, 53 and with
applications of this concept to the sale of new homes, 54 the court de-
47. Quinn & Phillips 249-251.
48. 2 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property § 221(1), at 177 (1967).
49. Id. at 178
50. Quinn & Phillips, 235 n.18.
51. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, § 162, at 257-259 (1970).
52. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
53. Id. at 432, 462 P.2d at 473.
54. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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termined that as a matter of public policy a warranty of habitability
should be implied in leasing agreements. The court in Lemle construed
the lease to be primarily a contractual relationship, with mutuality of
covenants, providing the lessee with the full range of contract remedies. 55
Although Lemle involved a furnished dwelling, the decision was not
limited to furnished premises, and the court reaffirmed its holding as to
unfurnished dwellings shortly thereafter.5"
In Marini v. Ireland,57 the tenant had repaired a cracked and leaky
toilet, and deducted the amount from her rent. The landlord brought an
action to evict for non-payment of rent. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey utilized a contract theory to find an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. The court found that, since the lease restricted the use of the property
to "dwelling," this implied that the object of the agreement was suitable
living quarters. Further, the court found that the implied warranty and
the covenant to pay rent were mutually dependent.5 a In so finding, the
court upheld the tenant's right to correct essential service deficiencies,
and to deduct the cost from the rent.
In the leading case of Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,59 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found an implied warranty
of habitability based on the housing regulations of the District of Colum-
bia. In Javins, the three appellants, defending an action to evict for fail-
ure to pay rent, offered to prove about 1,500 violations of the District of
Columbia Housing Regulations within the premises. The court stated:
[W]e... hold that a warranty of habitability, measured by the standards set out
in the Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is implied by opera-
tion of law into leases of urban dwelling units covered by those Regulations
and that breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach
of contract.6°
In effect, the court in Javins found an implied warranty of compliance
with housing regulations, and just such a statute was added to the District
of Columbia Housing Regulations.6'
55. 51 Hawaii 426, 432-33, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969).
56. Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969).
57. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
58. Id. at 145-46, 265 A.2d at 534-35. On constructive conditions, see J. Cala-
mari and J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, §§ 141-49, at 229-36 (1970).
59. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
60. Id. at 1072-73.
61. D.C. Housing Regs. § 2902.2 (1971).
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Although the appellate courts of New York have not as yet ruled with
respect to an implied warranty of habitability, trends indicate that such
an implied warranty may be established.
In Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 62 the Civil Court of the City of
New York, New York County, failed to find such an implied warranty,
but held that the landlord had a duty to maintain the premises in a habit-
able condition because of the requirements of the Multiple Dwelling
Law.6 3 The same court, however, in Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown,"4 did
find an implied warranty as a defense to the landlord's action for rent.
The court held that violations of the Housing Code and the Multiple
Dwelling Law would permit a defense in eviction proceedings for non-
payment of rent where (1) the landlord has acted in bad faith, and seri-
ous violations impairing habitability exist, or (2) where the violations
are substantial and code enforcement has been ineffective, or (3) where
violations are substantial, and their continuance is part of a purposeful
effort to force tenants to leave their apartments.0 5 In reaching its decision,
the court distinguished two appellate division cases"6 on the grounds that
in those cases (1) that landlord had acted in good faith; (2) the viola-
tion did not significantly impair habitability; and (3) routine housing
code enforcement was expected to be effective.6 7
Should the higher courts in New York follow the Amanuensis decision,
and extend the concepts therein to a general warranty of habitability, the
remedies of the tenant in cases of denial of essential services will be
greatly expanded.
B. Harassment without Denial of Essential Services
Where there is no denial of essential services, clearly the foregoing
statutes, as well as an implied warranty of habitability, will not provide
adequate relief. However, there may be an effective remedy under the
implied warranty of quiet enjoyment.
This warranty has been long implied in the leasehold relationship. It
62. 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
63. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law §§ 78, 80 (McKinney 1961).
64. 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
65. Id. at 21, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
66. Davar Holdings, Inc. v. Cohen, 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911
(1st Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 828, 21 N.E.2d 882 (1939); Emigrant
Indus. Sav. Bank v. One Hundred Eight W. Forty Ninth St. Corp., 225 App. Div.
570, 8 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd mern., 280 N.Y. 791, 21 N.E.2d 620
(1939).
67. 65 Misc. 2d at 19, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
[Vol. I
19721 TENANT REMEDIES-NEW YORK APPROACH 79
"affords protection to a lessee in his enjoyment of the leased land as
against wrongful acts of the lessor or by one who has a title paramount."'68
The breach of this covenant may justify equitable relief by way of an in-
junction. 9 If the tenant gives up his possession it may result in a con-
structive eviction, freeing the tenant from liability for rent .70 However,
the law has been established that:
The wrongful conduct of a lessor that merely results in an interference with
the enjoyment of leased land does not relieve the lessee from his obligation to
pay rent. If this results in a breach of the lessor's covenant for quiet enjoyment
the lessee may be entitled to damages but in the absence of a provision to the
contrary the covenants in a lease are independent.71
This limitation, however, may be changed under the theory evolved
in warranty of habitability cases. The courts should apply the mutuality
of covenants rationale to the warranty of quiet enjoyment. If the rent
covenant were conditioned upon the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the
tenant could deduct his damages from his rental payments. 72
An additional remedy for harassment without denial of essential ser-
vices may be found in the application of tort theory to the landlord-tenant
relationship. The New York Supreme Court has already done this in
Scheman v. Schlein.73
In this case, plaintiff-landlord filed suit for libel. Defendant-tenants
counterclaimed, seeking damages for the landlord's harassment on the
grounds of prima facie tort. The landlord moved to dismiss the counter-
claims for failing to state a cause of action. The tenants claimed that the
landlord had committed wilful and deliberate acts of misconduct in order
to cause the tenants either to consent to a rent increase or to move from
their dwellings, rent-controlled apartments in New York City. Tenants
alleged that the landlord made telephone calls at extremely late hours
and threatened to bring unfounded litigation.
It was further alleged that the landlord persuaded his daughter and
68. W. Burby, Handbook of the Law of Real Property, § 62, at 147 (3d ed.
1965).
69. Id. § 62 at 148.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 76 at 173.
72. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
73. 35 Misc. 2d 581, 231 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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son-in-law to take possession of the apartment directly above and to
create disturbing noises at late hours. The landlord moved to dismiss
the counterclaim on the basis of failure to plead special damages, a
requirement of a cause of action in prima facie tort. The court held, how-
ever, that the cause of action lay in traditional tort, sounding in inten-
tional infliction of mental distress. Although there was some evidence of
physical injury in Scheman, the court stated that there was no such pre-
requisite for recovery, citing Battalla v. State of New York.74
The court also noted that both injunction and punitive damages were
available as remedies, without pleading special damages, as the action
sounded in traditional tort."5 The Scheman case has since been favorably
cited for the application of Battalla to intentional torts. 6 It stands as an
available yet little-known approach to the problem of harassment where
the landlord has not denied essential services. The greatest advantage of
this tort remedy is the fact that it is unrelated to, and therefore unlimited
by, the inequality inherent in the landlord-tenant relationship.
Vi. Conclusion
It may be fairly stated that New York's legislative remedies have failed
to solve the basic problem inherent in the landlord-tenant relationship.
These failings are manifested by time delays in causes of action, require-
ments in some cases of abandonment of the premises, provisions for re-
turn of withheld monies to the landlord without penalty, and lack of
effective coercive sanctions.
While the early common law viewed the landlord-tenant relationship
74. Id. at 583, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 551, citing Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (holding that physical injury is not nec-
essary for a cause of action in negligent infliction of mental distress). See also Fer-
rara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958); Halio
v. Lurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961).
75. Scheman v. Schlein, 35 Misc. 2d 581, 584-85, 231 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552-53
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
76. See Kalina v. Gen. Hosp. of City of Syracuse, 18 App. Div. 2d 757,
235 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (4th Dep't 1962) (dissenting opinion), aff'd mem., 13
N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1963); Ruiz v. Bertolotti, 37
Misc. 2d 1067, 1069, 236 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd mem., 20 App.
Div. 2d 628, 245 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (2d Dep't 1963) (deliberate malevolent conduct
confined purely to words); Haight v. McEwen, 43 Misc. 2d 582, 583, 251 N.Y.S.2d
839, 841 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See also Kharas & Koretz, Property, 15 Syracuse L. Rev.
295, at 302 (1963); Tymann, Bystander's Recovery for Psychic Injury in New
York, 32 Albany L. Rev. 489, at 492 (1968).
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as requiring no more of the landlord than a right to possession and non-
interference, present requirements of necessity impose responsibilities of
upkeep, maintenance and provision of services upon the landlord. Once
such duties exist, the very foundation of the law should change. It is
tempting, therefore, in view of recent case law developments discussed
above, to place the burden of revision of the landlord-tenant relationship
on the courts, asking them to mold the common law, as it is developing,
to encompass present needs, to achieve a fair balance of power between
landlord and tenant. This, however, the courts seem reluctant to under-
take.
In a recent New York Supreme Court case," the court noted that it
was the role of the legislature to change such ancient foundations of com-
mon law, and refused to find a general implied warranty of habitability
in a clearly sub-standard dwelling. In Lindsey v. Normet, the United
States Supreme Court recently stated that:
Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the
definition of landlord-tenant relationships is a legislative and not a judicial
function. Nor should we forget that the Constitution expressly protects against
confiscation of private property or the income therefrom.78
It seems clear, therefore, that the legislature must act to resolve the plight
of the urban tenant. Such remedies as causes of action based on implied
warranties of habitability, quiet enjoyment, and freedom from harass-
ment, with stringent sanctions, are necessary. In his dissent in Lindsey,
Mr. Justice Douglas quoted Judge Wright's description of the fundamen-
tal problems attendant with reform in this area:
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they
seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which includes
not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and door, proper sanitation,
and proper maintenance.79
77. Golden v. Gray, 327 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
78. Lindsey v. Normet, 92 S. Ct. 862, 874 (1972).
79. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), as quoted in Lindsey v. Normet, 92 S. Ct. at 880
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Mr. Justice Douglas further stated:
This vital interest that is at stake may, of course, be tested in so-called sum-
mary proceedings. But the requirements of due process apply and due process
entails the right "to sue and defend in the Courts," a right we have described
as "the alternative to force" in an organized society.80
80. 92 S. Ct. 862, 880, citing Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S.
142 (1907).
